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Wednesday 24 June 2009

GAS EXPLOSIONS



Flash Point and Flammable Limits

Flash points and flammable limits in percent by volume have been tabulated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) (National Fire Protection Association, Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases, and Volatile Solids, NFPA 325, Quincy, Mass.). Pressure particularly affects flash point and the upper flammable limit (UFL); see later section entitled “Effect of Temperature, Pressure, and Oxygen.” Mists of high-flash-point liquids may be flammable; the lower flammable limit (LFL) of fine mists and accompanying vapor is about 48 g/m3 of air, basis 0°C and 1 atm (0.048 oz/ft3). For practical purposes, LFL is the same as lower explosive limit (LEL). (Ignitability limits depend upon the strength of the ignition source; the ignitability range for relatively weak ignition sources is less than the flammable range.) LFLs in percent by volume generally decrease as molecular weight increases. The equilibrium vapor pressure of a flammable liquid at its closedcup flash point about equals its LFL in percent by volume. Thus, the vapor pressure of toluene at its closed-cup flash point (4.4°C or 40°F) of 1.2 percent (1.2 kPa) is close to its LFL of 1.1 percent.

Limiting Oxidant Concentration (LOC)

It is often prudent to base explosion prevention on inerting. The LOC is the concentration of oxidant—normally oxygen—below which a fuel-oxidant explosion cannot occur. (The LOC is also called MOC, the minimum oxygen for combustion.) With adequate depletion of oxygen, an explosion cannot occur whatever the concentration of fuel. Nevertheless, in these circumstances a fuel–air–inert gas mixture may become flammable if sufficient air is added. Many LOCs are given in NFPA 69. In general, organic flammable gases or vapors will not propagate flame in mixtures of the organic, added nitrogen, and air below about 10.5 percent by volume O2 at 1 atm and near normal room temperature. Hydrogen (LOC = 5 percent) and some other inorganic gases have lower LOCs. For LOCs of 5 percent and greater, the O2 concentration should not exceed 60 percent of the LOC, but with continuous monitoring the O2 may be kept 2 percent below the LOC (NFPA 69, 1992).
Neutronics, Inc., of Exton, Pennsylvania, supplies an inerting control system that has had wide application in many industries. Explosion prevention by inerting has several advantages over explosion protection techniques, such as explosion venting. For example, with successful inerting, fires or business interruptions cannot occur. Nevertheless, beware of the potential of asphyxiation with inerting; proper vessel entry procedures must be implemented and occasionally it may be prudent to monitor for oxygen in workplaces.

Detonation

A deflagration can develop into a gaseous detonation in vessels and piping under certain conditions with enhanced explosion effects. Many factors affect detonation formation and effects. Briefly, upon ignition, pressure waves in a closed tube move through unburned gas. Subsequent waves move faster through the unburned gas, because of heating from previous pressure waves. Adiabatic compression results in high enough temperature to ignite gas ahead of the original flame and a detonation develops. (This ignition by compression to form a detonation is sometimes also called pressure piling.) The peak pressure in a stable detonation is on the order of 30 times the initial absolute pressure, disregarding the usually nondamaging spike of still higher pressure; reflected pressure is much higher than this 30 multiplier. (Special review is necessary for overpressure developed in an unstable [overdriven] detonation.) Nevertheless, in usual plant vessels without large length/diameter ratios, detonation is unlikely at 1 atm and near normal room temperature. Strong equipment may be subject to damage in a detonation, and rupture disks alone cannot control a detonation. Flame arresters are now commonly used to help protect against detonations; see the article on flame arresters in this section. But the best procedure to guard against the destructive effects of detonations is to prevent the formation of flammable mixtures

Explosion Protection

Where prevention of flammable mixtures may not be feasible, protection facilities must be installed; sometimes, too, backup explosion protection facilities are used in conjunction with inerting systems. Containment, suppression, or venting are used for protection against internal deflagrations in fuel-air mixtures. Although these methods may protect against deformation or rupture of a vessel, damage to internal appurtenances may still occur. Containment and suppression prevent the discharge of environmentally unacceptable materials to the atmosphere.

Containment

The design pressure (maximum allowable working pressure) to prevent rupture of equipment for most gas-air mixtures initially at 1 atm should be 304 kPa gauge (44.1 psig), and to prevent permanent deformation, 608 kPa gauge (88.2 psig) (National Fire Protection Association, Explosion Prevention Systems, NFPA 69, Quincy, Mass., 1992, p. 11). NFPA 69 provides important additional design information on deflagration pressure containment.

Explosion Suppression

With explosion suppression, an incipient explosion is detected and—within a few milliseconds—a suppressant is discharged into the exploding medium to stop combustion. Pressure and optical detection systems are used; suppressors are pressurized
and release the suppressants when actuated by an electroexplosive device.



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